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Abstract
Background: Performance-based financing (PBF) is often proposed as a way to improve health system performance. In 
Benin, PBF was launched in 2012 through a World Bank-supported project. The Belgian Development Agency (BTC) 
followed suit through a health system strengthening (HSS) project. This paper analyses and draws lessons from the experience 
of BTC-supported PBF alternative approach – especially with regards to institutional aspects, the role of demand-side actors, 
ownership, and cost-effectiveness – and explores the mechanisms at stake so as to better understand how the “PBF package” 
functions and produces effects.
Methods: An exploratory, theory-driven evaluation approach was adopted. Causal mechanisms through which PBF is 
hypothesised to impact on results were singled out and explored. This paper stems from the co-authors’ capitalisation of 
experiences; mixed methods were used to collect, triangulate and analyse information. Results are structured along Witter 
et al framework.
Results: Influence of context is strong over PBF in Benin; the policy is donor-driven. BTC did not adopt the World 
Bank’s mainstream PBF model, but developed an alternative approach in line with its HSS support programme, which is 
grounded on existing domestic institutions. The main features of this approach are described (decentralised governance, 
peer review verification, counter-verification entrusted to health service users’ platforms), as well as its adaptive process. 
PBF has contributed to strengthen various aspects of the health system and led to modest progress in utilisation of health 
services, but noticeable improvements in healthcare quality. Three mechanisms explaining observed outcomes within 
the context are described: comprehensive HSS at district level; acting on health workers’ motivation through a complex 
package of incentives; and increased accountability by reinforcing dialogue with demand-side actors. Cost-effectiveness and 
sustainability issues are also discussed.
Conclusion: BTC’s alternative PBF approach is both promising in terms of effects, ownership and sustainability, and less 
resource consuming. This experience testifies that PBF is not a uniform or rigid model, and opens the policy ground 
for recipient governments to put their own emphasis and priorities and design ad hoc models adapted to their context 
specificities. However, integrating PBF within the normal functioning of local health systems, in line with other reforms, is 
a big challenge.
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Background 
Health systems in many low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs) face a number of structural problems and 
inefficiencies. In view of the lack of success of most reform 
attempts, performance-based financing (PBF) has been 
proposed as a way to catalyse comprehensive reforms and 
help improve health system performance.1 PBF is a supply-
side form of results-based financing whose core features are 
the following: performance-based incentives are earned by 
service providers; payments are targeted at individual health 
facilities and administrations, often with trickle-down effect 
to health workers; there is usually some split of functions 
between regulation, purchasing, fund-holding, verification 
and service delivery; payments are linked to outputs, modified 
by quality indicators.2 Following a few positive experiences, 
especially in Rwanda,3,4 PBF has fastly expanded in sub-
Saharan Africa in the past decade. To our knowledge, PBF 
implementation in LMICs has almost always been supported 
by donors, particularly the World Bank which administers 
the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund (HRITF) created 
in 2007 to support results-based financing approaches in the 
health sector (see https://www.rbfhealth.org). The Belgian 
Development Agency (BTC) has also supported PBF in 
several countries among which Rwanda and Burundi.
In Benin, after two inconclusive experiences led by the Ministry 
of Health (MoH) in 2007 and BTC in 2008-2009, PBF was 
again experimented in 2012 through a World Bank-supported 
pilot project in eight health districts. The MoH then requested 
BTC to follow suit in the five districts it was supporting 
through a health system strengthening (HSS) project: Comé-
Bopa-Grand Popo-Houeyogbé (CBGH), Klouèkanmé-
Toviklin-Lalo (KTL) and Aplahoué-Djakotomey-Dogbo 
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In a recent article, Gorik Ooms has drawn attention to the normative underpinnings of the politics of 
global health. We claim that Ooms is indirectly submitting to a liberal conception of politics by framing 
the politics of global health as a question of individual morality. Drawing on the theoretical works of 
Chantal Mouffe, we introduce a conflictual concept of the political as an alternative to Ooms’ conception. 
Using controversies surrounding medical treatment of AIDS patients in developing countries as a case we 
underline the opportunity for political changes, throug  politi al articulation of an i sue, and collective 
mobilization bas d on such an articula ion.
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In a recent contribution to the ongoing debate about the role of p we  in global health, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the normative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He id ntifies three related proble s: (1) a lack of agre m nt 
a ong global health scholars about their normative premis s, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” H  calls 
for greater unity between scholars and etween scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying nor ative 
premises and greater openness when it comes to advocacy.1
We commend the effort to reinstate power and politics in 
global health and agree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health research “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to move away from,” Ooms is submitting to a liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly criticizes the outcomes 
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
conflicts and reduces it to either a rationalistic, economic 
calculation, or an individu l question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he sta es that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
secondary, or derived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative c ceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe,
and her respo se is to develop an ontological conce ti n of
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of 
antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested to become 
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social relations is partial and precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize an issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
world in a c nflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
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t e r ative er i i gs f gl al ealt  litics. 
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a g gl al ealt  sc lars a t t eir r ative re is s, 
(2) a lack f agree e t et ee  gl al ealt  sc lars a  
licy- akers regar i g t e r ative re ises erlyi g 
licy, a  (3) a lack f illi g ess a g sc lars t  
clearly state t eir r ative re ises a  ass ti s. is 
c f si  is f r s e f t e ex la ati s “ y gl al 
ealt ’s licy- akers are t i le e ti g t e k le ge 
ge erate  y gl al ealt ’s e irical sc lars.” e calls 
f r greater ity et ee  sc lars a  bet ee  sc lars 
a  licy- akers, c cer i g t e erlyi g rmative 
re ises a  greater e ess e  it c es t  a v cacy.1
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take t e litical as t e ri ary level a  t e r ative as 
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alter ative c ce t alizati  f t e litical a  e ce free 
s fr  t e “false ile a” s als  a ts t  esca e. 
“ lt g  c str ctivists ave e asize   erlyi g 
r ative str ct res c stit te act rs’ i e tities a  
i terests, t ey ave rarely treate  t ese r ative str ct res 
t e selves as efi e  a  i f se  y er, r e asize  
 c stit tive effects als  are ex ressi s f er.”2 is 
is t e starti g i t f r t e litical t e rist a tal ffe, 
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(ADD) in the Mono-Couffo region (South Benin); Bassila, 
and Djougou-Ouaké-Copargo (DOC) in the Atacora-
Donga region (North Benin). In 2015, PBF was scaled up in 
all districts of the country thanks to financial support from 
Gavi and the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (GFATM) which adopted the World Bank’s approach. 
The latter is similar to that implemented in other countries 
(Rwanda, Burundi) and relies on a project coordination unit 
for piloting, on an external firm for verification of results, and 
on community-based organisations for counter-verification. 
However, as explained below, BTC has developed a promising 
alternative, more integrated and less resource-consuming 
approach which is grounded on existing domestic institutions 
and networks, aims to strengthen the local health system, 
and uses peer review for verification of results and health 
service users’ platforms for counter-verification. Since 2015, 
the MoH has initiated a joint process aimed at harmonising 
the PBF approaches in view of rendering it country-led and 
sustainable.
As pointed by a recent literature survey, what PBF actually 
entails is not straightforward, and existing PBF schemes 
around the world differ on almost every single of its usual 
composing elements; moreover, the exact mechanisms 
through which PBF financial incentives, contractual features 
and ancillary components such as increased control and 
accountability mechanisms operate are not well understood.5,6 
Therefore, the objective of this paper is to analyse and draw 
lessons from the experience of the BTC-supported PBF 
alternative approach developed in Benin, taking account 
of its context, and to explore the mechanisms at stake so as 
to better understand how the “PBF package” functions and 
produces its effects. This is important to demonstrate that 
PBF should not be viewed as a uniform or rigid model and on 
the contrary, governments should adapt PBF designs to their 
context specificities and priorities. The institutional aspects, 
the role of demand side actors, the issues of ownership and 
cost-effectiveness are given particular attention. The paper 
concludes by discussing sustainability issues in relation to 
PBF.
Methods
Since it aims to “open the black box” of PBF,5 this paper adopted 
an exploratory, theory-driven evaluation approach.7 Indeed, 
the successive BTC health sector support programmes have 
been designed as pilot, research-action programmes aimed 
at testing a number of hypotheses supposed to contribute to 
increasing health system performance through strengthening 
the health system at central, intermediate (departmental) and 
local (district) levels. The technical and financial document 
orienting the current programme, called PASS-Sourou, lays 
out a complex intervention logic explaining how planned 
activities are hypothesised to interact towards five expected 
results, which together are hypothesised to strengthen the 
health system’s three key dimensions: supply-side, demand-
side and governance. Noticeably, PBF is not isolated as a single 
activity or result, but is referred to as a transversal approach 
contributing to several results, with activities relating both 
to the supply-side and demand-side of the system. The 
programme orientation document also specifies that the PBF 
model should keep on being tested so as to ensure it is people-
centred, equity-oriented and sustainable.8
From this programme orientation document as well as from 
authors’ participation in the design and development of the 
BTC alternative PBF approach since 2012, and through an 
iterative process, three causal mechanisms through which 
PBF is hypothesised to impact on results were singled out, 
that we intend to explore in this paper: (i) comprehensive 
HSS at district level; (ii) acting on health workers’ motivation 
through a complex package of incentives; and (iii) increased 
accountability by reinforcing dialogue with demand-side 
actors. This set of hypotheses may basically be outlined as 
shown in Figure 1.
Since the BTC alternative PBF approach has been conceived 
as a systemic intervention with a possibly broad range of 
effects on the health system, and thus since we intend to 
analyse the interactions between PBF and the local health 
system, we broadly followed the PBF monitoring & evaluation 
framework proposed by Witter and colleagues.2 Therefore 
results are presented based on analyses of: (1) the influence 
Implications for policy makers
• Benin has experimented two performance-based financing (PBF) approaches: one under the mainstream World Bank model, and an alternative 
one which differs substantially in terms of institutions, integration, and associated costs.
• Understanding the mechanisms that explain observed outcomes can help refine the various elements of PBF design according to context 
specificities.
• It is possible to develop an alternative, less resource consuming PBF approach, grounded on existing domestic institutions and therefore 
contributing to strengthening local health systems.
• In Benin, PBF enabled to improve healthcare quality but increase in utilisation of health services did not automatically follow suit.
• The alternative PBF approach developed in Benin has helped achieve progress mostly through: comprehensive health system strengthening 
(HSS) at district level; acting on health workers’ motivation through a complex package of incentives; and increased accountability by reinforcing 
dialogue with the demand-side actors.
Implications for the public
A bottom-up performance-based financing (PBF) approach has been developed and implemented in Benin since 2012 as an alternative to the 
mainstream model supported by several donors. This approach is integrated in existing local institutions (decentralised governance, peer review 
verification, counter-verification entrusted to health service users’ platforms); it is not much resource consuming and enables to strengthen the local 
health system. PBF, including its ancillary components, has contributed to strengthen various aspects of the health system (equipment, information 
system, human resources, governance). After four years of implementation, PBF has led to modest progress in utilisation of health services, but most 
of all noticeable improvements in quality of care.
Key Messages 
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of context over PBF; (2) policy formulation; (3) design; (4) 
implementation; (5) effects of PBF on health systems.
This paper stems from the co-authors’ capitalisation of 
experiences, that is usually defined as transformation of 
experience into shareable knowledge.9 It is issued after 4 
years of research-action, at a time when, on the one hand, 
both World Bank and BTC funds available to support PBF 
are ending (respectively in June and September 2017); and 
on the other hand, the MoH is urged to take stock of donor-
supported PBF schemes to design its own model and find 
budget rooms to finance it. The theory-driven evaluation 
approach adopted was conceived through an iterative process 
and relies on crossed perspectives from all the co-authors. 
They have all been involved either directly or indirectly in 
the BTC programme – be it as coordinator of the overall 
HSS programme, technical assistant, MoH recipient at 
departmental or district level, headquarter backstopping or 
consultant; one of them is also an academic with extensive 
experience in Benin. For each of the five domains analysed 
below, mixed methods were used to collect, triangulate and 
analyse information, including: financial and technical data 
produced by the BTC-supported project over four years (third 
quarter 2012 to third quarter 2016), routine data about the 
health system and results, existing records and studies on 
the PBF approaches implemented in Benin; key stakeholders 
interviews performed at national and operational levels during 
a previous research10; and mainly participative observation 
of PBF implementation – including on the field by those co-
authors involved at departmental and district levels, and also 
during the PBF harmonisation process launched by the MoH 
in 2015 (as members of the four joint missions and other 
technical workshops), which enabled to compare the pros and 
cons of the two PBF models implemented to date.
Results
Influence of Context over Performance-Based Financing
As argued by Witter and colleagues, since health systems 
are complex adaptive systems, it is necessary to include the 
context in understanding and documenting PBF, and to 
monitor the continuous interactions between the context 
and other PBF domains (or features) over time.2 Benin 
makes no exception and PBF was introduced in a complex 
system plagued with important bottlenecks. The National 
Health Forum organised in November 2007, which gathered 
some 600 participants, performed an in-depth assessment 
of the health sector context, and formulated a number of 
recommendations which guided the design in 2009 of the 
new 10-year health sector development plan. Main issues 
identified relate to governance in the health sector (poor 
performance, lack of leadership), poor quality of healthcare, 
inadequate infrastructure and equipment, and the need to 
valorise human resources for health – some of them will later 
be targeted by PBF (governance, quality, human resources). 
However, if the importance of establishing a management 
system based on a culture of performance, accountability 
and results was referred to, the possibility of introducing PBF 
was not mentioned. Rather, “orthodox” solutions to improve 
governance and staff motivation (such as salary increases and 
distance allowances) were proposed. An emerging priority 
was to install a consistent quality insurance system in the 
health sector.11 As for the 2009-2018 Health Sector Plan, it 
also only vaguely refers to the need to design mechanisms 
enabling to incentivize staff retention and performance, 
through improving working conditions, valorisation of 
performance, and adoption of retention measures. This plan 
does not mention PBF.12
Introduction of PBF in the health sector in Benin was 
obviously propelled by its international popularity, which also 
triggered additional donors later during the implementation 
phase. As explained below, PBF was introduced with support 
from various donors – mainly the World Bank, but also BTC 
who piloted a performance premium scheme in one district in 
2008 and 2009, plus other donors who also initiated punctual 
PBF schemes (notably UNICEF at community level). Another 
influential contextual element deals with the creation in 2011 
of a joint HSS platform, following the signature in November 
2010 of the first “Compact” between the MoH and five donors 
within the framework of the International Health Partnership 
and related initiatives. The HSS platform gathers the World 
Bank, GFATM, Gavi and BTC around the MoH, with support 
from the World Health Organization (WHO). In this context, 
the four main donors agreed on a geographical distribution of 
their HSS support so as to cover all the 34 health districts of 
the country: 8 were already supported by the World Bank and 
5 by BTC; Gavi and the GFATM agreed to support respectively 
the 2 and 19 remaining districts. Involvement of new donors 
will prompt a harmonisation process and thus adaptation of 
some elements of the design of both PBF approaches.
Policy Formulation
The World Bank project’s Appraisal document candidly 
explains that:
“In 2007, Benin started to test [Results-Based Financing 
(RBF)] in 3 districts. According to an evaluation carried out 
in 2008, the experiment was plagued with numerous issues 
related to implementation […]. After several workshops 
and study tours (in Rwanda), the MoH decided to continue 
and even to scale-up this experience, but only after a deep 
redesign of the RBF mechanism. The MoH then applied 
for a RBF grant ($11 million) under the Multi-Donor Trust 
Fund for Health Results Innovation […]. [H]ealth workers’ 
Figure 1. Hypotheses on How the BTC  Alternative PBF Model Impacts 
on Results. Abbreviations: HSS, health system strengthening; BTC, 
Belgian  Development  Agency; PBF, performance-based financing.
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unions were involved very early in the policy dialogue, 
as they were initially quite reluctant to RBF. Again, after 
several workshops and one study tour to Rwanda, they 
became strongly supportive of the mechanism. Finally, in 
August 2009, the Cabinet (“Conseil des Ministres”) officially 
declared RBF a key priority for the health sector.”13
The World Bank approach is a mainstream one. It is very much 
inspired by the Rwandan experience and follows the standards 
of the World Bank PBF Toolkit.14 The project was initially 
conceived under a randomised control trial enabling to test 
the efficacy of various PBF designs with a control group. In 
2012, following implementation of PBF in the 8 World Bank-
supported districts, the MoH requested BTC to also introduce 
a PBF component in its existing HSS programme. However, 
BTC developed an alternative approach, more suited to its 
ongoing intervention. Benin later submitted HSS proposals 
to Gavi and the GFATM comprising a PBF component 
based on the World Bank approach, which was presented as 
the national approach. Since 2015, PBF has been a national 
strategy however exclusively financed by donors. The World 
Bank’s project coordination unit coordinates PBF activities in 
29 districts, while BTC supports coordination mechanisms in 
its 2 regions of intervention.
According to our field observations and interviews performed 
since 2006, PBF is not a home-grown policy but is donor-
driven in Benin. Some former MoH top executives were 
initially opposed to PBF, and it is only after intensive lobbying 
from the World Bank (including workshops and study tours 
in Rwanda) that they finally bought the idea. However, 
ownership of PBF within and outside the MoH remains limited 
to a few people (see below) – and for long, only the World 
Bank approach had some kind of visibility outside the project 
coordination unit and a few MoH top managers. Outside 
an independent study performed in 2013 and published in 
2014,10 it is only during the 2015 joint annual health sector 
review, and later an inter-agency field mission organised in 
June 2015, that the coexistence of two PBF approaches was 
discussed by the MoH and its main partners. Consequently, a 
process aimed at harmonising PBF in view of its sustainability 
was initiated by the MoH and supported by BTC and other 
donors. Four joint missions were organised between July 2015 
and October 2016. They enabled to identify strengths and 
weaknesses of each approach in view of refining a Beninese 
PBF approach, and to inform a wider range of stakeholders 
about PBF. However, national ownership of PBF is weak, as 
testified by the fact that a number of key stakeholders within 
and outside the MoH were only informed about PBF during 
the second and third joint missions on PBF harmonisation in 
October 2015 and July 2016.15,16 Moreover, in early 2017, there 
is still no national MoH entity formally in charge of PBF, and 
no domestic budget to finance it.
Design
BTC did not adopt the World Bank standard PBF design, 
which relies on a project coordination unit for overall piloting, 
strategic purchasing and payments; a purposely-created 
external verification agency, managed by an international 
consultancy firm, charged with verification, coaching and 
technical assistance; and punctually hired community-based 
organisations for community counter-verification (however, 
this happened only in 2014). For coherence-sake with focus 
of its initial HSS support programme as well as for budget 
constraints, BTC developed an alternative ad hoc approach 
through an action-research process, with strong involvement 
of recipients and backing from a research institution charged 
with scientific support to the programme.17 This approach 
builds on existing institutions and local networks with light 
external support, and uses peer review for verification. This 
makes it both more integrated and owned at national and 
local levels, and less resource consuming. Its main features 
are described below.
Performance-Based Financing Coordination
An important feature of PBF in general is separation between 
the various functions of regulation, financing, purchase of 
services, service provision and data verification, thus creating 
a clear division of labour between each player and contributing 
to transparency.14 The BTC-supported alternative approach 
has entrusted PBF coordination to a steering committee 
organised quarterly at departmental (provincial) level, 
consisting of representatives from the departmental health 
office, donors, mayors, civil society organizations (CSOs), 
health services users’ platforms (see below), the mutual health 
organisations’ medical officer, and service providers. This 
committee is in charge of adapting the overall PBF approach 
to the local context, deciding on the level of PBF subsidies 
based on results checked through verification and counter-
verification, and managing complaints.
Purchasing and Payment Functions
The PBF purchasing function is devoted to city councils 
that take decisions and sign the PBF contracts. The latter are 
also co-signed by the departmental directorate for health, 
BTC, steering committee chairman, and each health facility. 
To date, PBF subsidy payment is still managed by the BTC 
programme, but stakeholders are now exploring how to 
delegate it to a national institution.
Verification of Results
Verification of results reported by health facilities is based on 
peer review through mixed team supplemented by external 
stakeholders in order to guarantee independence. At health 
centre (HC) level, a mixed peer review team composed of 
a doctor, a midwife, a financial officer, and a nurse coming 
mainly from the departmental office and an external district 
leads verification quarterly. It ensures simultaneously 
verification of quantities along a matrix of quantitative 
indicators, and quality assessment along another matrix 
of quality measures. It also draws the sample to be used for 
counter-verification. At district hospital (DH) level, a mixed 
peer review team coordinated by the departmental health 
office and supervised by the mutual health organisations’ 
medical officer leads verification quarterly. It only controls 
quality of healthcare since BTC has so far chosen not to 
include quantitative indicators at hospital level. At the 
level of the district health management team (DHMT), 
quantitative indicators are quarterly pre-validated by the 
local departmental directorate for health, and then audited 
by another departmental directorate for health and mutual 
health organisations’ medical officer.
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Counter-Verification
Interestingly – this is to our knowledge the only example in 
Africa – counter-verification of results at community level 
is entrusted to health services users’ platforms, which are 
networks gathering a wide range of relevant stakeholders 
(representatives from local councils, CSOs/ non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), mutual health organisations, 
community health workers) whose creation and functioning 
has been supported by BTC for several years. They are both 
in charge of controlling the effectiveness of care (based on a 
sampling of HCs records) and conducting satisfaction surveys 
among HCs and DH patients.
Quantitative and Qualitative Measures
Overall, the BTC approach puts a lot of emphasis on quality 
of care: at HC level, bonuses calculated based on actual 
quantitative indicators (number of cases times “prices” 
associated to each indicator) are weighed by a qualitative index 
combining assessment of technical quality and customers’ 
satisfaction. At DH level, only qualitative measures are taken 
into account. Finally, once PBF subsidies are allocated to 
each facility, about 30%-40% is kept by the facility to finance 
functioning and activities, while the rest is distributed to 
motivate staff (all categories included) according to a flexible 
multi-criteria allocation grid.
Implementation
BTC started to implement PBF at DHMT level in the third 
quarter (Q3) of 2012. Then it was progressively rolled over at 
HC and DH level in the three districts of a first department 
(Mono-Couffo) in the first quarter (Q1) of 2013, and then 
in the 2 districts of the other department (Atacora-Donga) 
in the second quarter (Q2) of 2013. The initial design 
was progressively adapted with revision of indicators and 
qualitative matrices in Q2 2014 and later in Q3 2015. The 
criteria for calculation of DHMT subsidies also evolved: they 
were initially based on implementing routine activities, but 
now are also linked to the attainment of some performance 
indicators by HCs in their district. The level of PBF subsidies 
also increased so as to progressively align on the level of those 
granted by the World Bank, which were initially much higher. 
Other adaptations include gradual involvement of private 
HCs and community health workers in PBF, in line with the 
relevant national policy documents; as well as the introduction 
of equity bonuses to provide extra incentives to disadvantaged 
facilities. BTC had initially programmed a 1.5 million EUR 
envelope to support PBF until the end of 2015, and then to 
transfer PBF management to the World Bank. However, this 
was actually not possible and BTC rose another 1 million 
EUR funding in order to finance PBF until September 2017. 
Table 1 shows the main evolutions in quantitative indicators 
and their associated premium or price at HC level.
Influence of context is noticeable in the fact that adaptations 
in implementation were particularly prompted by the 
harmonisation process in view of PBF sustainability initiated 
in 2015. The MoH launched this process following a 
recommendation from the health sector’s joint annual review. 
It was much welcome since the GFATM started to support 
PBF in 19 districts in Q3 2015, and Gavi in the remaining 
two districts in Q4 2015. A first joint mission aimed at PBF 
harmonisation was organised by the MoH (with support 
from consultants hired by BTC) in July 2015, which enabled 
to carry out a consensual comparative analysis of the two 
PBF approaches implemented to identify room for mutual 
improvements. A roadmap for PBF harmonisation in view of 
its sustainability was elaborated and later regularly updated, 
and a number of general principles agreed upon. A second 
joint mission, organised in October 2015, allowed setting the 
path for the definition of common, consensual indicators 
and quality measure matrices. Technical officers from the 
Table 1. Evolutions in Quantitative Indicators and Their Associated Premium at HC Level, 2013-2016
Indicator Price Applied in 2013 (XOF)a
Price Applied Q1 2014–
Q2 2015 (XOF)
Price Applied Q3 
2015–Q3 2015 (XOF)
1. New outpatient consultation 130 150 200
2. Attended eutocic birth 2000 2500 3000
3. Emergency delivery reference 2000 2500 3000
4. Completely vaccinated children 500 600 1500
5. Pregnant women fully immunized in tetanus toxoid vaccine (TT2-5) 300 400 1200
6. Pregnant women who received the 2nd dose of sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine 300 400 1200
7. Family planning acceptors (end of month) 700 800 1000
8. Screening for tuberculosis Koch Bacillus + 2000 3500 6000
9. Tuberculosis cases treated and cured 3500 8000 9000
10. Referred cases arrived at the DH 700 800 900
11. Acute severe malnutrition cases detected and clinically treated at HC 1000
12. Acute severe malnutrition cases referred by the HC and arrived at the DH 1000
13.
Acute severe malnutrition cases treated at HC for up to 28 days and declared 
cured according to criteria
2000
14.
Children born from seropositive mothers whose delivery respected the 
protocol and whose PCR 1 test was carried on
10 000
Abbreviations: HC, Health Centre; DH, district hospital.
 Source: Data collected from the BTC HSS “PASS-Sourou” programme.
a 655.957 XOF = 1 Euro.
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2 programmes pursued this work until a third mission 
organised in July 2016. However, a number of issues were 
not agreed upon at that time – notably the costing of the new 
indicator matrices, and choice of common mechanisms and 
institutions for verification and counter-verification. BTC 
therefore decided to adapt its indicator and quality matrices, 
but to keep its pricing level.
Perceptions by local stakeholders about PBF are mixed. A 
qualitative survey performed in November 2013 in 2 health 
districts – one supported by BTC, another one by the World 
Bank – showed that after 1 or 2 years of PBF implementation, 
field actors welcomed PBF – especially additional supervision 
and training attached to it – and were overall satisfied with PBF. 
However, they did not show a sense of ownership and viewed 
it as “another project.” Local stakeholders also accommodated 
the operational instructions to suit their constraints (eg, 
adapted the records they were supposed to fill in). A major 
issue under both approaches was perception of unfairness 
of PBF. This arose from the fact that until the introduction 
of equity bonuses, the subvention of all facilities, whatever 
their initial endowment, were determined based on the same 
indicators and quality checklist. Thus disadvantaged facilities 
lacking material, equipment or staff, were automatically 
penalised, despite the efforts they made. Moreover, BTC 
started by giving financial incentives to DHMTs while staff 
at HC level received only low premiums in the first two years 
of implementation.10 However, since then, BTC has regularly 
adapted its approach to address the problems raised in 
departmental steering committees. PBF subsidies were raised, 
qualitative matrices adapted, and equity bonuses introduced. 
Moreover, contrary to the World Bank’s, the BTC programme 
entails an infrastructure and equipment facility, which was 
used to level out HCs in that respect.
Costs
Main cost items relate to managing the programme (as long as 
it is a separate entity), generating and verifying performance 
data. However, in Benin, the management costs of the 
integrated PBF approach developed in the BTC programme 
are not very resource consuming. Table 2 shows the annual 
PBF management costs under the BTC alternative approach 
as implemented in 2016, covering 5 health districts for an 
estimated population of 1 759 925 inhabitants.
This amounts to 0.22 EUR management cost per person 
per year. Note that it is possible to complement the current 
verification strategy to reinforce its independence, for 
instance by adding external controls on a sample of 
verification mission, a quality control of satisfaction surveys 
and community feedback activities: this would raise the cost 
per person per year to 0.24 EUR.
In addition to management costs, one has to add the cost 
of PBF subsidies. Actual subsidies paid over the period Q4 
2012–Q3 2016 are shown in Figure 2.
In 2015, cost of PBF subsidies paid to structures amounted 
to 0.36 EUR per person per year, to which transaction costs 
amounting to 0.23 EUR per person per year need to be added, 
bringing the total PBF cost to 0.59 EUR per person per year. 
As a matter of comparison, in the eight districts supported by 
the World Bank project, subsidies paid to DHs amounted to 
US$0.15 (0.14 EUR) per person per year and subsidies paid 
to HCs amounted to US$0.95 (0.86 EUR) per person per 
year in 2015, hence 1 EUR PBF subsidies paid to structures; 
cost of the external verification agency amounted on average 
to US$0.15 (0.14 EUR) per person per year for verification, 
plus US$0.21 (0.19 EUR) per person per year for technical 
assistance over the period 2012-2015. Note however that this 
includes neither the general management costs of the project 
coordination unit, nor counter-verification since it happened 
only in 2014.18
Effects of Performance-Based Financing on Health Systems
It is difficult to isolate the PBF effects – especially since it does 
not only comprise financial premiums, but also includes a 
number of contractual features and “ancillary components” 
which contribute to its effects.5 In Benin as well, PBF stricto 
sensu is complemented by various ancillary supports. It is 
noticeable that BTC’s alternative PBF scheme is embedded 
in an HSS programme, hence it was expected to act upon 
Table 2. Annual PBF Management Costs Under the BTC Approach as Implemented in 2016 (EUR)
Cost Euros
Technical assistancea 177 488
General managementb 65 670
Organisation of steering committees (2 departments) 12 196
Verification of results (peer-review) 106 714
HC level 73 176
DH level 12 196
DHMT level 12 196
Departmental directorate for health level 9147
Counter-verification of results by health services users’ platforms (control of effectiveness of care and customer satisfaction surveys) 28 965
HC level 24 392
DH level 4573
Total management costs per year 391 034
Abbreviations: BTC, Belgian Development Agency; PBF, performance-based financing; DHMT, district health management teams; HC, Health centre; DH, district 
hospital. 
Source: Data collected from the BTC HSS “PASS-Sourou” programme based on actual costs in 2015 and 2016.
a Based on assumptions on the relative share of time spent by each technical assistant of the programme to PBF, varying from 12.5% (2 mutual health 
organisations’ medical officers) to 60% (2 counsellors of the demand-side facility).
b Assumption: 10% of the programme’s overheads plus scientific support budget.
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the various building blocks of the health system. A first 
causal mechanism identified in the process of this theory-
driven evaluation is precisely about comprehensive HSS at 
district level. The HSS programme allows the provision of 
comprehensive and systemic support to the 5 districts in 
view of strengthening capacities and developing local health 
systems. Such comprehensive support comprises integrated 
supervision by a multidisciplinary team at each level of the 
health system, from HCs to departmental management 
teams; continuous in-job training; infrastructure 
rehabilitation and medical equipment maintenance; reference 
& counter reference; support to the local governments and 
representatives from service users. The PBF components are 
perfectly integrated within the vision of a strong local health 
system: for instance, PBF verification missions go beyond mere 
verification of results, but are also opportunities for coaching, 
retro-information from communities, dissemination of good 
practices, and progressive development of a quality insurance 
approach. This coherent approach enables to multiply the 
benefits from PBF and, according to feedback from DHMTs 
and healthcare providers, has contributed to improving 
quality of care. Moreover, consistent local HSS was expressed 
as a hypothesis to explain that PBF had slightly better results 
in the districts supported by BTC than those supported by 
the World Bank (field observation during the fourth joint 
mission on PBF harmonisation, October 2016).19,20
Main observed effects are explained below, as well as other 
tentative causal mechanisms by which PBF impacts on results.
Infrastructure and Equipment
The BTC HSS programme comprises a facility aimed at 
reinforcing infrastructure and equipment, notably to support 
blood transfusion, emergency neonatal and obstetric care, 
and hospital hygiene. Moreover, with the introduction of 
PBF, a share of PBF subsidies is kept at facility level to finance 
investment on small equipment and activities like motorbikes 
to facilitate immunisation and mother & chid health outreach 
activities; repair of ambulances and supervision vehicles; tiling 
of operating rooms and maternity wards; accommodation for 
waiting rooms, acquisition of curtains, bed sheets, and hand 
washing devices contributing to hospital hygiene and patient 
comfort. Choice of acquisition and/or repair of equipment are 
Figure 2. PBF Subsidies Paid by BTC Since Q4 2012a.
Abbreviations: DHMTs; district health management teams; PBF, performance-based financing; BTC, Belgian  Development  Agency; HCs, health 
centres; DHs, district hospitals.
Source: Data collected from the BTC HSS “PASS-Sourou” programme.
a Reduction in Q3 2014 stems from change in qualitative matrix.
Figure 3. Outpatient Attendance (New Consultations/Person/Year).
Abbreviations: NHMIS, national health management information 
system; PBF, performance-based financing.
oriented in view of improving quality of services according to 
PBF matrices requirements and standards (technical quality) 
as well as feedback from community surveys (perceived 
quality).
Information Systems
Another building block strengthened in the context of PBF 
is the national health information and management system 
(NHIMS). Verification of results enabled to support facilities 
in better fulfilling the NHIMS. One observes a reduction in 
the gap between the obviously over-reported NHIMS data 
and PBF-validated indicators over time in the five districts 
supported by BTC (see Figures 3-5). Besides, the World 
Bank project has supported a number of initiatives aimed 
at improving data management, quality and utilisation 
and thus synergy between PBF and NHIMS, among which 
the implementation of the data warehouse district health 
information system 2 (DHIS2) in all districts in 2015.
Human Resources
The effect of PBF on human resources is not measured 
systematically. PBF has not had direct impact on health staff 
hiring and deployment and overall, the districts supported 
by BTC did not benefit from major health staff increase, as 
illustrated in Figure 6. However, PBF had a likely indirect 
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effect on staff mobilisation. For instance, we have observed 
that some HCs have called for support from neighbouring 
HCs’ qualified staff to implement some technical activities in 
order to reach PBF objectives. Two DHs in the Mono-Couffo 
region took the initiative of entering into partnership with 
the Faculty of Medicine to host trainees in fourth grade of 
specialisation in gynaecology and obstetrics. In the context 
of PBF, some healthcare professionals were hired to fill vital 
gaps through service contracts (for example, a specialised 
Figure 4. Fully Vaccinated Children (%). 
Abbreviations: NHMIS, national health management information 
system; PBF, performance-based financing.
Figure 5. Attended Eutocic Deliveries (%). 
Abbreviations: NHMIS, national health management information 
system; PBF, performance-based financing.
Figure 6. Evolution of Qualified Staff Per Category in the 3 districts Supported by BTC in the Mono-Couffo Department, 2012-2015.
Abbreviations: GPs, general practitioners; BTC, Belgian Development Agency.
Source: HR Department, Mono-Couffo Departmental Health Directorate.
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nurse was hired by a HC in the district of Bassila); however, 
many did not remain at their assigned position (observation 
from the BTC “PASS-Sourou” programme). More generally, 
interviewed health providers reckoned that PBF forces them 
to depart from routine, to be more professional and to respect 
national norms.10 Peer review also helps concerned health 
staff to improve their practice.
A second causal mechanism identified in the process of this 
theory-driven evaluation is the fact that PBF appears to be 
acting on health workers’ motivation through a complex 
mechanism, all the more since beyond financial premiums, 
all contractual features and ancillary components of PBF are 
likely to impact on workers’ various sources of motivation.21 
Bertone and colleagues22 have warned against the risk of 
looking at PBF payments in isolation, without reference to the 
overall remuneration of health workers. Their study confirms 
that the remuneration of health workers is complex and 
interrelated so that the different financial incentives cannot 
be examined independently. They have assessed that in Sierra 
Leone, PBF contributes to about 10% of the total income of 
health workers – yet, despite this relatively low contribution, 
workers’ views on the bonuses are positive while views on 
salary are negative. In Benin, the average monthly salary of 
clinical health staff at HC level was estimated at about 76 
EUR, plus about 11 EUR in premiums in 2011 in the eight 
districts supported by the World Bank.23 No such survey has 
been recently performed in the districts supported by BTC, 
but according to the Department of Financial and Material 
Resources of the Mono-Couffo Departmental Health 
Directorate, salaries have increased by 25% between 2011 
and 2014 throughout civil service. In 2015, the PBF subsidies 
distributed by BTC to health staff in the three districts in the 
Mono-Couffo department amounted to 177 415 500 CFA 
francs (270 468 EUR) – that is, an average of 157 283 CFA 
francs (240 EUR) per agent, all categories of staff. At the same 
time, the salary and allowances paid by the State amounted to 
990 242 292 CFA francs (1 509 614 EUR), which means that 
PBF financial premiums represent basically 13% of official 
staff income (data obtained from the Department of Financial 
and Material Resources/Departmental Health Office, and 
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BTC “PASS-Sourou” programme). Paul and colleagues10 
already reckoned that whereas interviewed health staff often 
referred to financial premiums in their discourse, actually the 
latter were too weak—and “blurred” into so many others—to 
have a real, lasting inciting effect. So the authors concluded 
that PBF motivates health workers through other elements of 
its “package”: especially, regular formative supervisions enable 
to strengthen management and clinical capacities, thus play 
an important role in improving performance; PBF also fosters 
emulation amongst health facilities as well as improvement 
in data collection and use of data for management purpose. 
Moreover, it is important to note that PBF in Benin provides 
financial incentives to all staff – including support staff – 
which tends to favour teamwork (eg, motivate cleaners).
Populations (Health Service Users)
An important aspect of BTC’s HSS programme and 
interesting feature of its alternative PBF approach is support 
to organisation, capacity-building, and strong involvement 
of the demand-side actors through so-called health services 
users’ platforms. These platforms have been setup and 
developed in view of defending the rights and strengthening 
the voice of health services’ users. Their role is not limited 
to PBF; they also manage complaints from health service 
users, for instance. After a few years of operation, not only 
their technical competences, but also their legitimacy, have 
been strengthened, enabling true dialogue with healthcare 
providers – which is not the case when contracting out NGOs 
for punctual tasks.24 
We have here, the third causal mechanism identified in the 
process of this theory-driven evaluation: PBF especially 
appears to be acting through increased accountability due to the 
strengthened dialogue with the demand-side actors. Indeed, 
the PBF approach developed was viewed as an opportunity to 
implement the model of “Local Health System” as described in 
the Dakar Declaration.25 This model updates the health district 
and implies a multi-actor approach, shared stewardship, as 
well as a focus on the right to health and increased ownership 
by the local communities. The BTC alternative PBF approach 
bestows involvement of health service users’ platforms in PBF 
governance (through participation in departmental steering 
committees) and counter-verification, plus other dedicated 
tasks such as complaint management and follow-up. This has 
undoubtedly reinforced their legitimacy and contributed to 
strengthening the interaction and dialogue between supply 
and demand for healthcare in the districts. Ultimately, this 
has enabled strengthening of the local health system through 
more balanced dialogue between service providers and 
demand side actors, and consequently, it facilitated the search 
for consensual solutions and problem solving.
Health Outcomes
Overall, four years of implementation of PBF in the 5 districts 
supported by BTC was associated with limited progress 
in utilisation of health services, but most of all noticeable 
improvements in some features of quality of care, including 
user satisfaction. After correcting for autocorrelation, a recent 
econometric study on panel routine data in Benin shows little 
and non-significant effects of PBF (considered simplistically 
as a “yes/no” variable) over a selection of quantitative 
indicators.19 Especially, outpatient attendance is still low in the 
five districts, ranging from 14.54% to 47.14% in 2015 (coming 
from resp. 12.78% and 22.28% in 2013) (PBF validated data). 
Yet, a number of PBF validated indicators followed by BTC 
(which are more reliable as shown above, but by definition 
cannot be compared “before and after”) have improved over 
the three years 2013-2015, and some districts have particularly 
well improved their performance over the period, as shown 
in Figures 7-9. Especially, the CBGH district experienced an 
increase in attended deliveries (resp. deliveries referred from 
HC to DH; family planning acceptor rate) from 33.49% (resp. 
13.67%; 25.52%) in 2013 to 87.65% (resp. 97.57%; 90.53%) in 
2016 (data extrapolated from the three first quarters).
As for quality improvement, Figures 10-12 show that quality 
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Figure 7. Proportion of Attended Deliveries at HCs Per District, 2013-
2016a.
Abbreviations: DOC, Djougou-Ouaké-Copargo; KTL, Klouèkanmé-
Toviklin-Lalo; ADD, Aplahoué-Djakotomey-Dogbo; CBGH, Comé-Bopa-
Grand Popo-Houeyogbé; HCs, health centres.
Source: BTC HSS “PASS-Sourou” programme (PBF validated data). 
a 2016 data are extrapolated from the first 3 quarters of the year.
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Figure 8. Percentage of Deliveries Referred From HC to DH Per District, 
2013-2016a.
Abbreviations: DOC, Djougou-Ouaké-Copargo; KTL, Klouèkanmé-
Toviklin-Lalo; ADD, Aplahoué-Djakotomey-Dogbo; CBGH, Comé-Bopa-
Grand Popo-Houeyogbé; HC, health centre; DH, district hospital.
Source: BTC HSS “PASS-Sourou” programme (PBF validated data). 
a 2016 data are extrapolated from the first 3 quarters of the year.
Figure 9. Family Planning Acceptor Rate Per District, 2013-2016a.
Abbreviations: DOC, Djougou-Ouaké-Copargo; KTL, Klouèkanmé-
Toviklin-Lalo; ADD, Aplahoué-Djakotomey-Dogbo; CBGH, Comé-Bopa-
Grand Popo-Houeyogbé.
Source: BTC HSS “PASS-Sourou” programme (PBF validated data). 
a 2016 data are extrapolated from the first 3 quarters of the year.
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scores have improved at all levels in the five districts. At 
HC level, unweighted average quality score increased from 
65.92% in Q2 2013 to 75.75% in Q3 2016. Unweighted average 
technical quality score of DHs increased from 63.07% in Q1 
2013 (only three hospitals included) to 89.82% in Q3 2016 
(all 5 hospitals included). Unweighted average quality score 
of DHMTs increased from 33.21% in Q4 2012 to 84.18% in 
Q3 2016.
Mutual trust between populations and healthcare providers 
has increased as well. User satisfaction rates have already 
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Figure 10. Average Quality Scores at HC Level Per District, Q1 2013-Q3 2016.
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Figure 11. Technical Quality Scores of DHs, Q1 2013-Q3 2016.
Abbreviations: KTL, Klouèkanmé-Toviklin-Lalo; DOC, Djougou-Ouaké-Copargo; ADD, Aplahoué-Djakotomey-Dogbo; CBGH, Comé-Bopa-Grand Popo-
Houeyogbé; DHs, district hospitals.
Source: BTC HSS “PASS-Sourou” programme.
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
Q1
2013
Q2
2013
Q3
2013
Q4
2013
Q1
2014
Q2
2014
Q3
2014
Q4
2014
Q1
2015
Q2
2015
Q3
2015
Q4
2015
Q1
2016
Q2
2016
Q3
2016
DH KTL
DH DOC
DH ADD
DH Bassila
DH CBGH
Figure 12. Quality Scores of DHMT, Q4 2012-Q3 2016.
Abbreviations: KTL, Klouèkanmé-Toviklin-Lalo; DOC, Djougou-Ouaké-Copargo; ADD, Aplahoué-Djakotomey-Dogbo; CBGH, Comé-Bopa-Grand Popo-
Houeyogbé; DHMT, District Health Management Teams.
Source: BTC HSS “PASS-Sourou” programme.
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
DHMT KTL
DHMT DOC
DHMT ADD
DHMT Bassila
DHMT CBGH
Paul et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2018, 7(1), 35–47 45
increased on average from 21% in Q3 2015 to 44% in Q1 2016 
in the 2 DHs of the Atacora-Donga department, and from 
20% in Q3 2015 to 40% in Q1 2016 for the three DHs of the 
Mono-Couffo department (data collected by the BTC HSS 
“PASS-Sourou” programme).
Discussion
Study Design
Contrary to the World Bank project’s initial design, BTC did 
not construct its PBF scheme as a randomised control trial, 
which prevents from demonstrating causal relationships 
between PBF and observed results. Only “before-and-after” 
comparisons can be made, and the effect of PBF cannot be 
isolated since BTC’s project entails various interventions 
aimed at strengthening the local health system in the five 
supported districts. Since a quantitative impact assessment 
does not fit the design of the BTC PBF scheme, we opted 
for a theory-driven evaluation approach, and identified 3 
causal mechanisms through which PBF seem to have had 
effects and contribute to observed outcomes. Note that other 
authors found evidence supporting these causal mechanisms 
elsewhere: some have observed that PBF supported HSS (first 
mechanism), including leadership, equipment and health 
management and information system10,26-28; an increasing 
number of studies have pointed the complex effects of 
PBF over health workers’ motivation in LMICs (second 
mechanisms)22,28-32; and Renmans and colleagues’5 framework 
insist on the fact to consider patients as ‘benefitting principals’ 
in the PBF contract or scheme (third mechanism relating to 
dialogue with demand-side actors). Using the Witter and 
colleagues’ framework2 also helped us organise our results 
in a logical way, enabling to include the context into the 
analysis. However, other potential ways through which PBF 
is supposed to impact on results have not been confirmed 
in Benin, notably increased autonomy at facility level which 
is still lagging behind – partly because of administrative 
constraints, but also, as observed in some pilot districts 
supported by BTC, partly due to reluctance to change and 
lack of leadership in DHMTs and departmental teams.
Limitations of the Belgian Development Agency Alternative 
Belgian Development Agency Approach
The BTC PBF approach is promising and not much resource-
consuming in terms of verification: overall, five full time 
equivalents per year are devoted to verification of results, 
that is, one full time equivalent per health district covering 
on average 350 000 inhabitants. However, it also entails some 
flaws. Firstly, under the current system, the independence of 
peer verification may be questioned, especially compared to the 
external verification agency option chosen by the World Bank, 
Gavi and GFATM. Potential collusion between controllers 
and controlees is yet balanced by counter-verification at 
community level (which is not made in the World Bank 
districts) as well as inclusion of third-parties (notably, mutual 
health insurance medical officer) in verification teams. 
Secondly, the difficulty in measuring technical quality of care 
leads to quite cumbersome matrices and heavy measurement 
processes. Thirdly, even if BTC intended to build on existing 
institutions (DHMTs, departmental directorates for health, 
municipalities, and health service users’ platforms), PBF is not 
yet totally integrated with other processes. For instance, there 
are duplications with the many concurrent missions regularly 
visiting health facilities (in addition to PBF verification and 
counter-verification, there are monthly DHMIS2 verifications, 
regular monitoring and supervision missions, etc).
Cost-Effectiveness
Several authors have warned about the contradiction between 
the widespread use of PBF and the lack of studies of its costs 
or cost-effectiveness.33-35 A recent study in Tanzania warns 
against very high incremental costs of PBF (ranging from 
US$540 to US$907 in the pilot experiment and from US$94 
to US$261 for a national programme per additional facility-
based birth), as well as to potential substantial opportunity 
costs diverting attention from service delivery.28 The BTC 
alternative PBF model is not much resource-consuming since 
we estimated that in 2015, its total cost amounted to 0.59 EUR 
per person per year. This is far below the usual rule of thumb 
of an overall output budget of US$3 (2.8 EUR) per person 
per year recommended in low-income countries.14 It has to 
be noted however that it is complemented by other financial 
supports by BTC (including other HSS activities), other 
development partners, and of course the government budget 
and user fees. Since we have been unable to disentangle PBF 
and attribute measurable effects to PBF, we cannot estimate 
the cost-effectiveness of the BTC alternative PBF model. It can 
just be mentioned that, in the context of the learning process 
from the joint PBF harmonisation missions, Gavi and the 
Global Fund mandated an analysis of the PBF effects based 
on routine data along some selective quantitative indicators. 
Despite methodological constraints, notably due to poor 
quality of routine data, it shows no significant differences 
between the performance of the BTC-supported districts 
and those under the World Bank for most selected indicators 
– but even a significantly higher PBF impact on outpatient 
attendance and antiretroviral therapy initiation for pregnant 
women in the districts supported by BTC – and this at a much 
lower cost.19
Sustainability Issues
Despite promising results, PBF sustainability is at risk in 
Benin, both from institutional and financial points of view. 
A harmonisation process is under way, but the Beninese 
authorities have not yet decided on what institutional 
design PBF should take in the post-donor programme era 
– which is coming soon, since three development partners’ 
programme are ending by mid or end of 2017. It is definitely 
necessary to de-verticalise PBF at the national level (as is 
intended by the BTC programme), and to integrate it into 
normal functioning of the health system, as a transversal HSS 
strategy. However, this will not be an easy task since up to 
date, PBF is not yet coherent with a number of other reforms. 
Especially, the relation with the extension of the universal 
health coverage scheme and quality insurance processes is 
unclear. The national health financial strategy as well does 
not clearly state how PBF should position itself vis-à-vis other 
financing sources (central and deconcentrated government 
budgets, programme funding, user fees). Moreover, the 
World Bank approach – which is now implemented in 29 
out of 34 districts – is at odds with decentralisation. At the 
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technical level too, integration of PBF requires streamlining 
its design and reshaping a number of other processes 
(monitoring, supervisions, etc). As for financial sustainability, 
the government needs to find sufficient resources – and find 
appropriate ways of channelling them – to sustain PBF after 
donors have pulled out.36
Conclusion
This paper shows that an alternative, integrated PBF approach 
– as compared to the mainstream one promoted by the 
World Bank PBF Toolkit14 – developed with support from 
BTC in Benin proves to be at the same time less resource-
consuming and promising in terms of effects, especially with 
respect to local HSS (eg, local capacities, infrastructure and 
equipment), improved technical aspects of healthcare quality, 
and patient satisfaction. This approach is based on existing 
institutions that are in charge of governance (at departmental 
level), verification (through peer review, thus also enabling 
to mutually strengthen capacities) and counter-verification 
(through health service users’ platforms that reinforce dialogue 
between supply and demand in local health systems). It is 
thus a good basis for both ownership and sustainability. This 
experience testifies that PBF is not a uniform or rigid model, 
and opens the policy ground for recipient governments to put 
their own emphasis and priorities and design ad hoc models 
adapted to their context specificities.
Future phases of PBF development in Benin will need 
to take account of the experience accumulated by both 
interventions, so as to identify the most appropriate, efficient 
and sustainable design possible. However, several issues 
still need to be further studied to guide policy-making. In 
particular, one observes very different patterns of evolution 
between districts: some of them respond positively to PBF, 
others stagnate in terms of performance. Hence, the need to 
better understand the causes of these differences, and take 
appropriate decisions accordingly. However, integrating PBF 
within the normal functioning of local health systems, in 
full coherence with other reforms (decentralisation, human 
resource development, universal health coverage), remains a 
big challenge.
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